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Abstract
This paper studies the consequences of predation when rms deploy guard labor
as a means of protecting themselves. We build a simple model and combine it with
data for 144 countries from the World Bank enterprise surveys which ask about rm-
level experiences with predation and spending on protection. We use the model to
estimate the output loss caused by the misallocation of labor across rms and from
production to protection. The loss due to protection e¤ort is substantial and patterns
of state protection at the micro level can have a profound impact on aggregate output
losses. Various extensions are discussed.
1 Introduction
Although a central function of the state is to maintain law and order, it is widely appreci-
ated that a number of states, particularly in poor countries, fail to deliver. For example,
World Justice Project (2014) highlights the deciencies in formal and informal adherence to
basic principles of justice enforced by law around the world. The economic consequences
of this are now given a central role in explaining di¤erences in the level of income per
capita. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Besley and Persson (2011) have emphasized
this theme and the institutional underpinnings of e¤orts to build legal capacity to support
markets. One of the main approaches for assessing this has to be to exploit the correlation
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between cross-country di¤erences in summary measures of private and state predation and
income di¤erences.1 These capture a wide variety of e¤ects and are therefore di¢ cult
to link back to specic underlying mechanisms and distortions in resource allocation that
result.
This paper takes a bottom-up picture to the misallocation of labour due to weak law
and order taking a rm level perspective. We emphasize the importance of heterogeneous
predation threats in di¤erent rms and how these distort labor allocation between rms.
In addition to output losses from predation, we also estimate the cost of predation in
terms of the labor used for the protection of output. These distortions are highly relevant
even in developed countries. Protective service labor grew by about 2.4 percentage points
of total hours worked in Europe between 1993 and 2010, for example. This made it the
fastest growing occupation studied by Goos et al (2014). According to the US bureau
of labor statistics about 2.2 percent of all employed in 2014 worked in protective service
occupations. The model developed here provides a way to think about the welfare loss
imposed by allocating labor to improving security ends when it could have been used
productively. A key insight is that the threat of predation can lead to a welfare loss even
if there is no actual predation.
We make use of direct measures of distortion measures from the World Bank Enterprise
surveys.2 These can be used to create a quantitative assessment of the output loss due to
factor misallocation directly. To do this we propose a theoretical framework where rms
allocate labor to productive activity or predation. It provides a link between a rm-specic
predation threat and a rms response in terms of a lower level of total factor productivity
which is greater among rms where predation is a bigger problem. The advantage of having
rm level data on both dimensions, predation and protection, is that we do not need to
make any assumptions regarding the details of the endogenous relationship between these
two factors. The model and data can be used to generate an expression for the aggregate
output loss which depends on the joint distribution of predation, protection and rm level
productivity.
In line with the recent literature on resource misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson,
1See, for example, Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Djankov et al
(2002).
2These surveys are used to look at international productivity di¤erences in Bartelsman et al (2013).
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2008, and Hseih and Klenow, 2009), the framework also allows us to consider what would
happen to output if predation were lower. For this purpose, we take a low predation country,
South Korea, as the main benchmark. In this counter-factual, labor gets re-allocated from
protection to production and from rms that are least a¤ected by crime to those who
are most a¤ected by crime. Firm heterogeneity is important; the aggregate output loss is
particularly large when productive rms are vulnerable to crime. Moreover, labor mis-
allocated to protection due to the threat of predation generates an output loss even if
predatory activities are a pure transfer.3
The paper o¤ers an empirical estimate of how predation losses, compared to a bench-
mark, vary across countries, illustrating the importance of rm-level heterogeneity. For
some countries, these losses are around 10 percent of output. Moreover, we estimate that
around two thirds of these losses come from reallocating labor to protection rather than
using it productively.
One nding which comes from looking at rm-level heterogeneity is that, on the whole,
larger rms appear to be more susceptible to predation. That said, countries vary in the
extent to which this is true. We develop a specic parametric version of the model which
allows us to run a thought experiment in which we consider how much output di¤erent
countries would gain or lose from adopting a Chinese pattern of protection by rm size.
We estimate that output in Mexico, for example, would increase by about 3.5 percent
if this happened. Moreover, we show that low private costs of crime do not seem to be
primarily achieved through substituting private protection for public protection. Instead,
we nd a strong and robust negative correlation between the overall loss and measures of
the e¤ectiveness of the criminal justice system.
We extend the model to allow for sectoral heterogeneity in the production technology
using data based on US labor shares. This reveals an interesting pattern of sectoral di¤er-
ences in output losses. The model can be used to look at sectoral labor reallocation if the
threat of predation were eliminated. In countries with high predation, we estimate large
increases in labor supplied to the formal enterprise sector of the economy, more than 20
percent in the case of the construction sector which is both labor intensive and relatively
susceptible to more predation.
3This idea goes back to Tullock (1967, 1971) who discusses theft as an example.
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The analysis is also extended to consider the impact of predation on investment deci-
sions by rms. We nd that it has a negative e¤ect on investment while protection enhances
investment. This allows us to speculate on a wider range of e¤ects which could further
create an output cost from weak law and order. We also model the reaction of managerial
e¤ort to predation which can a¤ect rm-level productivity and nd that the output loss
estimates increase substantially from around 2.6 percent on average in a country to 5.2
percent.
The symptoms of lawlessness and disorder that we study here are specic. However,
they provide a di¤erent way of engaging in debates about the value of state e¤ectiveness
by building a bottom uppicture based on micro-foundations and micro-data. The World
Bank enterprise surveys are the only rm-level data that we are aware of which have a
wide coverage of countries, including those in the developing world and have not previously
been used to look at these issues. But it is also important to acknowledge that a bottom-
up exercise also has its limitations; a rm-level perspective is not able to engage in wider
debates about a whole range of macro-factors which inuence productivity across countries
and could be equally, if not more important. Thus, what we are o¤ering is only one piece
of a bigger picture based on a direct measure of an important distortion. However, there is
also value in specicity because we can isolate a specic channel rather than trying to look
at state e¤ectiveness at large where the specic role of any given channel is hard to discern.4
Hence, we view the top-down and bottom-up approaches as ultimately complementary lines
of work in trying to engage in debates in why poorly functioning states can have adverse
economic consequences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss
related literature. Section three introduces the data and documents some basic facts. In
section four, we lay out a model which we use to derive a measure of the output loss in the
enterprise sector relative to a benchmark case output. Section ve shows how this can be
brought to the data and section six presents estimates of output losses by aggregating rm
level data and illustrates how heterogeneous productivity matters for this. In section seven,
4Section H in the on-line appendix follows Bartelsman et al (2013) to show how the covariance between
di¤erent productivity measures and rm size is a¤ected by predation. The fact that we can measure
distortions directly means that we can also assess the extent of productivity rank reversals as discussed
by Hopenhayn (2014).
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we look at how adding measures of public protection a¤ects things and calibrate a constant
elasticity model for the protection technology to look at patterns of protection across rms
and countries. Section eight presents some additional analysis on rm investment, sector-
specic technologies, allowing for a labor reallocation e¤ect across sectors and endogenous
managerial e¤ort. Section nine concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a growing literature on the quantitative implications of resource misallocation
beginning with Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hseih and Klenow (2009).5 This has
lead to a debate about what it would take for distortions in factor and product markets to
have large e¤ects see, for example, Hopenhayn (2014). This paper has two novel features
compared to existing contributions First, we consider the consequences of private actions
to limit distortions. Second, we have a direct measure of a particular distortion since the
data provides reports of losses by rms as well as the share of sales spent on protection.
There is a large related literature which calculates the cost of crime.6 The standard
accounting approach is to estimate this cost simply by adding the costs and losses due
to crime. For example, Van Ours and Vollaard (2014) use estimates from an account-
ing approach to study the welfare gain from installing electronic engine immobilizers
in the Netherlands.7 Other approaches include individual valuations of counterfactuals,
contingent-valuation, and changes in market prices to estimate the welfare costs. For
example, Cook and MacDonald (2011) use both contingent-valuation surveys and jury
awards to victims of violent crimes to calculate the welfare gains from crime reductions.
And property prices are used to assess the cost of crime in London by Gibbons (2004).
Compared to this literature, the approach in this paper has more of a focus on macro-
economic implications and equilibrium e¤ects of crime distortions. Similar to us, Soares
(2009) also develops a simple model with both public and private security spending to
5For an overview of some of the wider issues involved in explaining cross-country income di¤erences in
terms of di¤erences in factor endowments and technology, see Caselli (2005).
6For an overview see Soares (2009).
7Their benchmark measures of the cost comes from the UK Home O¢ ce. The methodology is based
on Brand and Price (2000). This is an accounting exercise in which security expenditures, insurance costs
and damages are added up to derive a per case cost.
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organize existing measurement exercises. However, we focus on rm behavior and are able
to link the model directly to observables in enterprise survey data.
The role of private spending in driving up the welfare costs is an old theme in the crime
literature starting with Tullock (1967) and Becker (1968).8 Benson and Mast (2001), for
example, discuss how spending on protection can be quantied in assessing the costs of
crime. Besley, Fetzer and Mueller (2015) exploit shipping prices in the spot market for bulk
shipping to calculate the welfare cost of Somali piracy. The latter show that costs incurred
by the shipping industry were greatly in excess of the revenues that pirates extracted
through ransoms which is, in part, due to spending on armed security guards.
This paper follows in the footsteps of contributions which have emphasized labor mis-
allocation through employing guard labor. Jayadev and Bowles (2006) look at aggregate
evidence,9 while Field (2007) uses Peruvian data to show that families with weak property
rights remain at home to guard their property. The main contribution of this paper is to
widen the scope of these ideas to a range of country experiences using micro-data to gain
an insight in the macro-economic picture.
Finally, the paper is also related to the large literature, reviewed in Besley and Ghatak
(2009), on the economic consequences of imperfect property rights protection. This liter-
ature has looked at both macro- and micro- evidence; however, there is little work joining
the two together as we do here. Taking a macro-economic perspective, Acemoglu et al
(2001) and Hall and Jones (1999) argue that large di¤erences in income per capita can
be explained by di¤erences in institutions which a¤ect expropriation risk. The micro-
economic literature instead has explored the implications of property rights insecurity on
productivity and investment.10
8In line with the argument developed here, he notes that:
"The theft itself is a pure transfer, and has no welfare cost, but the existence of theft
as a potential activity results in very substantial diversion of resources to elds where they
essentially o¤set each other, and produce no positive product. The problem with income
transfers is not that they directly inict welfare losses, but that they lead people to employ
resources in attempting to obtain or prevent such transfers. A successful bank robbery will
inspire potential thieves to greater e¤orts, lead to the installation of improved protective
equipment in other banks, and perhaps result in the hiring of additional policemen. These
are its social costs, and they can be very sizable." (Tullock (1967), p. 231)
9They nd much higher numbers for guard labor than in our data. However, their denition includes
police and prison guards, supervisors in rms, the unemployed and military personal.
10See, for example, Besley (1995) and Goldstein and Udry (2008).
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3 Data
Our data comes from the World Bank enterprise surveys which are plant-level surveys of a
representative sample of an economys formal private sector agriculture, small informal
rms and pure government-owned businesses are excluded. They cover a range of top-
ics measuring the business climate including access to nance, corruption, infrastructure,
crime, competition, and performance measures. Since 2002, the World Bank has collected
this data from face-to-face interviews with top managers and business owners. This allows
us to use data from over 155,000 companies in 144 economies.11 The data is made available
both at the plant level and at di¤erent levels of aggregation. Further details on the data
and the collection methods can be found in Appendix A.
We focus on answers to two specic survey questions: (i) "In scal year [insert last
complete scal year], what percentage of this establishments total annual sales was paid for
security?" and (ii) "In scal year [insert last complete scal year], what were the estimated
losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson that occurred on this establishments
premises either as a percentage of total annual sale?". While not all questions are answered
by every enterprise that is surveyed, we have more than 155,000 observations where we can
calculate both pieces of data. In what follows, we will use the term predation to capture
the various forms of loss that could be experienced by rms, i.e. "theft, robbery, vandalism
or arson". Most of these acts are likely to have been perpetrated by criminals rather than
the state itself.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the plant level where we report weighted averages
using the survey weights provided by the World Bank. These numbers reveal that the
average expenditure by a rm was 1.7 percent of sales for security (protection) and the
loss in sales was around 0.8 percent due to theft, robbery, vandalism (predation).12 The
share of rms that report paying for security is at 62 percent and is more than double
the 20 percent reporting a loss. This makes intuitive sense. Not every rm that spends
on security is or has been victim of predation - this implies that losses due to predation
are spread throughout the population through the investment in security. The average
11We discuss our modications to the raw data in appendix A.
12In appendix Figure A1 we show that, on average, spending on protection is relatively constant across
rm size whereas predation losses increases slightly with rm size.
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rm size in our sample is about 120 workers which varies between 1 worker and just under
66,000. Table 1 also reports the sample size by country where the average is over 2400
rms per country. Finally, we report the fraction of rms in our sample which report
crime as most important obstacle to doing business. This is about 4 percent.
In Figure 1 we show a scatter plot of the country-level averages to the two core questions
for di¤erent years. These numbers are close to what the World Bank reports at the country
level. They illustrate the signicant variation across countries. There is also a clear
positive correlation between protection spending and damages. The latter suggests, in
line with common sense, that high levels of predation are associated with high e¤orts at
protection. There are two quite striking outliers in the data: Cambodia is an outlier in
terms of spending on protection and the Central African Republic is an outlier in terms of
predation.
For our analysis we use the number of workers, losses, spending on protection and
our model to make statements on rm productivity. In other words, we do not rely on
value-added calculations in the data. Data on sales and costs contain large errors so that
dropping outliers becomes a crucial issue. Our model allows us to use some of the three
most commonly reported parts of the data. This should minimize errors at the cost of
additional assumptions regarding the production function and the absence of distortions
in the labor market of the economy. We return to these issues in section 6 and discuss
value added measures in Appendix C.
More generally, there is a trade-o¤ involved in using the World Bank enterprise surveys.
They are not as carefully collected as some countrys manufacturing surveys. However,
they cover a wide range of sectors and unusually give information about some specic
distortions such as what we are examining here. The fact that they cover a wide range of
countries also widens the experience that we study. We are also comfortable in the belief
that employment which we use in our main calculations is reasonably well measured.
4 Conceptual Framework
Consider the enterprise sector of the economy, as dened by the World Bank Enterprise
surveys, which is populated by a nite set of rms with productivity levels, i, indexed by
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i = 1; ::; N where i denotes the proportion of rms type i in the population of all rms.13
We will think of the N rms in our data as representing a sample of rm types that we
aggregate to get the e¤ect of predation on the economy as a whole. Thus we think of rm
i as a specic type of plant in our data.
The enterprise sector allocates a xed amount of labor, L, with the wage rate w being
determined endogenously. This benchmark case is in e¤ect assuming that labor markets
in di¤erent parts of the economy are segmented. However, we will consider below what
happens if labor can migrate between the enterprise sector and other activities such as
agriculture, the informal sector or government employment.
A rm of type i hires labor li; taking the wage as given, and can choose to allocate
a part of this labor to security, denoted by ei. There is a type-specic protection tech-
nology which determines the fraction of output that a rm of type i realizes which is
denoted by pi (ei; g) 2 [0; 1] where g denotes investment by the state in protection. We
assume that pi (; g) is increasing and concave. Thus having more protection reduces the
amount of output that is lost. Our formulation of the protection technology allows for
rm-level heterogeneity. This makes sense since we expect exposure to predation to be
quite idiosyncratic, depending on the rms location, its political connections, the nature
of its production process/location of its client base. In particular, we make no a priori
assumption about how the protection technology covaries with productivity i. We will
rely on the data to tell us about this.
The arbitrary function pi (ei; g) allows for several interesting features in the data. For
example, our model could easily incorporate the possibility of spillovers between rms, e.g.
where
pi (ei; g) = p
i (ei; g; ei)
and ei is a vector of protection e¤ort by other relevant rms in the same location or sector.
Our model also allows both ei and pi (ei; g) to be endogenous to factors which we cannot
measure. In fact, it can be shown that, even controlling for location, sector and year of
the survey, rms with high ei are also rms which have low values of pi (ei; g). Under
the assumption that i does not change without predation this is not a concern for our
identication strategy as we measure both ei and pi (ei; g) directly. In section (6) we discuss
13We use i to capture the survey weights in the empirical implementation.
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the e¤ect on our results if this assumption is violated.
The fraction 1   pi (ei; g) of output is either transferred to criminals or destroyed by
their activity. Let  2 [0; 1] be the fraction that is a transfer. We do not have a
breakdown between vandalism and theft in the data. In the case of pure vandalism then
we would expect  = 0 i.e. no part of the lost output is transferred to criminals whereas
with theft it is reasonable to suppose that  > 0. In this case output is transferred rather
than destroyed. We will report our results for di¤erent values of  to see how much this
parameter matters to the conclusions that we reach.14
The output of a type i rm net of predation losses is:
yi = p
i (ei; g) i [li   ei] : (1)
The production function is a standard constant elasticity formulation with  < 1 being
the labor share. Hence, this is basically, a span-of-controlmodel in the spirit of Lucas
(1977). Here, we assume a common production technology, i.e.  is the same for all
rms. This constitutes a somewhat extreme case with unlimited heterogeneity in the
protection technology alongside a common production function (albeit with heterogeneous
productivity levels). Below, we will relax this by allowing  to be sector specic. We will
also extend the approach to allow both labor and capital to be used in production. The
value of the simple case that we begin with is that it allows us to home in on the novel
aspect of the approach before including complications.
The function pi (ei; g) in (1) is formally similar to the kind of policy distortion studied
in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). However, we add a key di¤erence of approach by
allowing rms to mitigate this distortion by choice of ei; i.e. choosing a level of protection.
However, this just shifts where the consequences of the distortion is felt since rms are not
using all of the labor that they hire productively.
A rm of type i chooses fei; lig to maximize
pi (ei; g) i [li   ei]   wli:
14Another interpretation of setting  = 0 is that we do not value the share of output that goes to
criminals even when GDP is not lower.
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There are two conditions which hold at an interior solution. First, there is the standard
condition stating that the marginal product of labor is set equal to the wage:
pi (ei; g)i [li   ei] 1 = w (2)
The second is that the marginal product of labor employed in protection is equal to that
of productive labor:
pie (ei; g)
pi (ei; g)
=

li   ei : (3)
Our analysis of the cost of predation will use this model to construct a counter-factual
with lower predation. Without predation we would have pi (ei; g) = 1 and ei = 0 for all i.
Note that using the model and data on li implies that we calculate the output loss
from predation as if labor use is not distorted otherwise. We are therefore studying the
marginal e¤ect of our measured distortions assuming that any others remain in place, i.e.
these are contained in i. We regard this a conservative approach which prevents us from
attributing other factors of rm productivity to predation. Some alternatives are discussed
in section 8.
5 Bringing the Model to the Data
We now use the model to derive an expression for aggregate output lost to predation in
terms of measurable factors. We will then consider the allocation e¤ects of the labor
market equilibrium and use this to derive an expression for the aggregate output loss.
Spending on Security In the data, we observe the share of sales that are spent on
protection by rm i in our data set. This can be related to the model by noting that this
is given by
i =
wei
pi (ei; g) i [li   ei]
= 
ei=li
1  ei=li (4)
after using (2). Another way to think about this is that the share of total labor hired that
is used as protection is ei=li = i= [i + ]. This relates the labor misallocation directly
to the share of sales variable from the data after we plug in an assumed value for . We
choose  = 0:66 as our core case below, i.e. a two thirds labor share. In the extensions we
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relax this assumption.
Predation Losses The share of losses due to predation experienced by rm i can also
be expressed in terms of the model as:
value of sales lost by rm i = i =
1  pi (ei; g)
pi (ei; g)
:
The data give us a direct measure of i and p
i (ei; g) = 1= [1 + i]. Note, however, that
given our assumptions on  the welfare loss due to predation is given by  +(1  ) =1+i
which implies that if  = 1 there is no welfare loss from predation itself since all predation
is a transfer.
Labor Market Equilibrium We assume that labor is allocated across rms to equalized
marginal products and with the wage adjusting to achieve this. This assumption allows
us to back out the relative productivities from rm size. Write rm is labor demand as:
li =
 
^i
w
! 1
1 
(5)
where
^i = i
1
(1 + i)

 + i

1 
(6)
can be thought of as adjustedrm-level productivity as a function of our two observables
fi; ig.15 Equation (5) states that rms hire more laborers if they are intrinsically more
productive (higher i), experience smaller predation losses (lower i) and allocate more
labor to protection spending (higher i).
To solve for the labor allocation across all rms, we sum the labor demands of all rms,
using sample weights, and equate labor supply, L, with demand to yield:
X
i
ili =

w
^
 1
1 
= L:
where ^ =
P
i

^i
 1
1 
1 
is an aggregate measure of productivity for the enterprise
15Note that with i = i = 0 we have ^i = i.
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sector as a whole.16 The share of total employment in rm i can then be written as:
li
L
=
 
^i
^
! 1
1 
: (7)
This share of total labor employed in rm i can be seen to depend exclusively on its relative
adjustedproductivity level.
In interpreting these equations, it is important to recall that ei will be chosen optimally
and hence determine fi; ig in equilibrium as a function of the protection technology and
the perceived threat of predation that a rm faces. Below, we will work with a specic
technology where we can calibrate the parameters of the protection technology from the
data explicitly. For the time being, we will state everything in terms of observables without
restricting the form of the protection function pi (ei; g).
Firm Level Productivity In order to estimate the output loss from predation and
protection, we need a measure of the rm productivity if the predation threat were removed,
i which we will refer to as "undistorted productivity. We can estimate i= where
 =
P
i (i)
1
1 
1 
, i.e. the rms relative productivity from the distribution of rm
size. To see this note that
i

=
(1 + i) (li)
1 


+i
1 
 P
j j
 
1 + j

(lj)
1 


+j
1  11 !1  (8)
using the fact that in the undistorted allocation,
P
jlj = L. Equation (8) is useful
in bringing the model to the data since it allows us to estimate the undistorted labor
allocation and hence the output level in the absence of predation. We will use it to create
productivity weights, i=, for each rm in the data based on its observed rm size, along
with its reported loss from predation and spending on protection.
Although we refer to, i as the undistorted level of rm productivity, we are using
this term in a very specic sense. The distortion which we observe in the data is specic
16In practice we use rm shares as sample weights i so that
P
i ili is the average rm size. As we do
not consider rm entry and exit this does not change our results.
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to predation losses and spending on protection. It is quite likely that, even if these were
removed, others would remain in place. We think of these other distortions remaining in
i and that we are capturing only the marginal e¤ect of the distortion due to predation
with a view to measuring how important it is in a¤ecting the level of output.
Aggregate Output Costs of Predation We now use equation (1) to write total output
in the rm sector. If we rely on the data to rewrite pi (ei; g) = 1= [1 + i] and li ei = li +i
we get
Y^ =
X
i
ii

 +
(1  )
1 + i

(li)



 + i

(9)
= L
X
i
i
i


 +
(1  )
1 + i
 
^i
^
! 
1  

 + i

after substituting in li from equation (7). This gives aggregate output with predation as a
function of fi; i;  ; ig.
In order to calculate the output loss due to crime, however, we need a benchmark
to compare this output to. For now, to generate a simple benchmark, we assume some
constant and low values of i = B and i = B across all rms where B stands for
benchmark.17 In principal any benchmark can be used including R = R = 0. It is
straightforward to show from equation (9) that the level of output in this benchmark case
is:
Y  = ' (B; B) L
X
i
i

i

 1
1 
(10)
where ' (B; B) =
h
 + (1 )
1+B
i 

+B

< 1. Note, that equation (10) displays the output
of the economy without crime when B = B = 0 so that ' (B; B) = 1. Using (10)
together with (9), yields the following expression for the proportional output loss from
predation and protection:
 =
Y    Y^
Y 
= 1 
P
i i
i

h
 + (1 )
1+i
i 
^i
^
 
1 


+i

' (B; B)
P
i i
 
i

 1
1 
(11)
17In section 7 we provide a more sophisticated way to calculate this benchmark in a model with para-
meterised predation and protection functions.
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This is a key equation that we bring to the data. We make ve key observations about it.
First observe that if i = B and i = B for all i then
^i
^
= i

for all i and hence
 = 0.18
Second, note that a convenient feature of (11) is that, with the exception of  and ,
it is stated entirely in terms of variables which are either observable or can be estimated
from the rm-level data using (8). We are therefore able to calculate  for each country
in our data set.
Third, equation (11) illustrates the importance of the heterogeneous pattern of preda-
tion i, protection i, and productivity i, in determining aggregate output losses. The
output loss from predation depends on how the threat of predation is correlated with rms
undistorted productivity levels. Thus if large rms are more susceptible to predation, this
can lead to higher losses in three ways directly higher i or indirectly through them
spending more on protection, i.e. higher i. These distortions will also a¤ect allocation
of labor across rms indirectly through changes in ^. Without predation, labor will be
reallocated towards rms that are heavily a¤ected as ^i=^ increases to i=.
Fourth, equation (11) makes clear why  matters. If more of the predation is in the
form of output transfers ( close to one) then the output cost is lower. However, even with
 = 1 there is still an output loss since some labor may be allocated to protection. Another
way to think of this is also to imagine that i = 0. Now the parameter  has no impact
on the output loss in (11); the loss is given entirely by i. Thus even an economy which
appeared to face no predation could in fact have a distorted level of output if the threat is
latent and it employs workers to guard against it. Below, we will explore how assumptions
regarding  a¤ect the calculation of the output loss due to predation.
Fifth, the output loss measure is increasing in the 'B. Hence the output loss will be
smaller if we use a less demanding benchmark than zero crime. Moreover, for values of
'B < 1, it is possible that some countries have an output gain, i.e. they have less crime
than the benchmark example. This will be avoided if we take the case of a low crime
country to compare all of the other countries to.
18This is because ^i
^
=
i
1
(1+B)
(+B )
1 
 P
i

i
1
(1+B)
(+B )
1 
 1
1 
!1  = i
15
6 Results
Our estimates of the output loss is based on the sample of rms in the World Bank
enterprise surveys.19 We look at variation across both countries and rms. Hence we
write ic for rm type i in country c with corresponding weights ic. We allow g to vary
across countries so that pic = pi (eic; gc) is the loss experienced by a rm type i in country c
when it allocates labor eic to protection. We could also allow  or  to be country specic.
However, we will maintain common values for these parameters in what follows.
It is important in interpreting the results that follow to realize that ic does not have
to be a purely technological parameter but could reect a range of other pre-existing
distortions in the economy. We are considering what would happen if we removed the
specic distortion that we are interested in while holding all others in place. The data
we have on i and i together with our model allow us to do this. However, this is quite
separate from whether, if one actually removed the distortion that we are considering,
there would be changes in i due to spillovers to other sources of ine¢ ciency. A case in
point would be a generalized improvement in the legal system which could have a range of
e¤ects.
Throughout this section, we will take as our benchmark, the least distorted country in
the data based on the parameter ' (B; B) which is South Korea for which the value is
0:9975. Hence, by construction, South Korea has an output loss of zero in the homogeneous
rm case.
Benchmark: Identical Firms Even though our main interest is in exploiting rm-level
heterogeneity, a useful benchmark is the case where all rms within a country are the same
with the same losses and spending on protection as well as the same level of productivity:
ic = c for all i in country c. Equation (11) now boils down to a very simple form:
c = 1  1
' (B; B)

 +
(1  )
(1 + c)


 + c

(12)
19We are not therefore able to say anything about losses from predation and/or protection experienced
by fully government-owned, agricultural or informal rms. Moreover, it is an open question whether such
rmsexperience with law and order is di¤erent from the rms on which we do have data and this is, in
any case, likely to be heterogeneous by country and rm type.
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where c and c are the country (weighted) averages for the share of sales lost to predation
and the share of sales spent on protection.20
Given direct measures of c and c, we can estimate the loss in (12) without any
assumptions about the technology pi (ei; g) and without the typical identication issues.
In our data, pc = 1=(1 + c) varies between 94:6 percent and 100 percent. Table 2 depicts
averages of ec=lc and c. The parameter  enters in both estimates. To explore how
much this a¤ects the results, Table 2 gives some summary statistics for the country/year
level averages assuming three di¤erent values,  = 0:9;  = 0:66 and  = 0:5. The rst
three rows of Table 2 show that our estimate of the fraction of the work force employed
in protection, ec=lc, varies from around 1.8 percent to 3 percent as we vary .21 The next
rows present estimates of the output loss for the benchmark case where  = 0 and for the
three values of . The estimated average output loss is about 2:4 percent regardless of the
choice of . We will for now focus on the case  = 0:66 until we look at sectoral variation
in  as an extension below. Table 2 also gives the average loss for  = 1 which is 1.6
percent. Thus, about two thirds of the output loss from predation in the enterprise sector
is estimated to be from expenditure on protection.
Figure 2, panel A shows the distribution of the output loss measure for  = 0 across
countries to give a sense of the heterogeneity of the loss. Most countries lose about 2
percent of their output due to crime.22 Around one 5th of countries lose more than 4
percent. In Figure 2, panel B we plot the output loss when  = 1. This illustrates just
how important the output loss coming from protection spending is. As in panel A, there
is considerable heterogeneity across countries and around one 5th of countries lose more
than 2.5 percent just due to spending.
Thus, even in an economy in which all predation is an e¢ cienttransfer from rms
to criminals, the loss in output caused by predation can still be substantial. This is an
interesting nding given that the main focus of the discussion about the cost of predation
and the misallocation that it causes has been on the fact that it reduces the output retained
by rms rather than the private actions that rms take to prevent it happening.
20Note that the share of workers employed in protection is given through +c = 1  ec=lc.
21These are reasonable numbers given the employment share of protection in the US in 2014 was between
0.7 and 2.2 percent depending on which denition we use.
22A country by country list is provided in appendix table A4.
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Heterogeneous Firms We now explore the implications of rm level heterogeneity in
productivity, predation and protection. As an intermediate step, Figure 3 plots the
loss in di¤erent deciles of the rm productivity distribution, i

, in two countries: China
and Mexico. We choose these two cases since both have decent-sized samples of rms.
Moreover, the pattern found in these two cases appear somewhat representative of the
pattern of output losses in Asian and Latin American economies. Asian countries tend to
show consistently lower output losses.
Figure 3 illustrates the variation in losses across the rm-size distribution calculated
as in equation (12) for every decile of rm size. It shows that losses in Mexico tend to be
proportionately greater in large rms compared to China. This suggests that there will
be distortions across rms in the way that labor is allocated. In Mexico there will be a
strong drive of labor away from larger rms. We will return to some further implications
of this in section 7 where we report the result of a thought experiment which increases
protection for larger rms.
The main point to take away from Figure 3 is that there is considerable variation across
countries regarding which part of the rm-size distribution is most a¤ected by predation.
A model with heterogeneous rms can take this into account in the calculation of aggregate
losses. The estimated output loss in country c is given by:
c = 1 
P
i ic
ic
c
h
 + (1 )
1+ic
i 
^ic
^c
 
1 


+ic

' (B; B)
P
i ic

ic
c
 1
1 
(13)
where we exploit rm level variation in productivity, losses and security expenditures in
the enterprise survey data.23 Again, given direct measures of ic and ic, we can estimate
the loss in (13) without any assumptions about the technology or exogeneity of pi (ei; g).
Note also that we have made no assumption regarding whether ei is provided by the rm
internally or whether ei is provided by another rm. Both are consistent with the data we
have. We discuss organized crime in the Appendix B.
Equation (13) also allows us to return to the key identifying assumption underlying our
23We validate this approach by looking at the correlation between the most comparable measure of crime
at the country level, homocides, in Table A1. We nd a positive correlation between our loss measure and
this measure both in pooled regressions and in panel regressions with country xed e¤ects.
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output loss estimates. We assume that a change in predation does not change the relative
productivity ic=c of rms. This assumption is violated if, for example, managerial e¤ort
or investment is hindered by predation so that productivity of rms would increase without
predation. In section 8 we discuss these possibilities further. We show that in this scenario
the most a¤ected rms are the ones who would benet most from the absence of predation.
The change from ^ic=^c to ic=c would then be even larger and our estimates provide a
lower bound to the true output loss.
Figure 4 compares the estimate from equation (13) to the estimates that come out the
model with identical rms, i.e. equation (12). Observations on the red line would mean
that the output loss estimate is identical with and without rm heterogeneity. Around 55
percent of the observations lie above this line and the loss increases on average by about
0.3 percentage points. In other words, allowing for heterogeneity tends to increase the size
of the estimated loss modestly. There are a few countries like Sierra Leone or Afghanistan
where the increased output loss with heterogeneity is particularly pronounced. This is
due to large rms being particularly susceptible to predation in these countries. In line
with Figure 3, Mexico is a notable member of this group of countries. We will see in the
following section that these are also countries that su¤er particularly from weak protection
of large rms.
We have run several robustness checks regarding both output loss estimates shown in
Figure 4. As a rst check we changed the benchmark from South Korea to China which
has a value of ' (B; B) = 0:9926 and nd that changes are minimal.24 We also ran checks
by excluding rms with very large weights ic, dropping outliers in terms of rm size and
restricting the analysis to countries with many observations. The ndings are fairly robust
to all of these changes.25 Our model allows us to calculate the productivity weights from
rm size alone and so we do not rely on data on sales and costs which are reported less
often and contain larger errors. Two ndings emerge if we calculate productivity weights
from sales and costs data, i.e. if we use value added estimates.26 First, if we focus on large,
24See Figure A2. Note, that some countries, including South Korea, now have a negative loss from
predation with respect to the benchmark.
25However, most of the extreme losses we nd in Figure 4 are in countries with small samples (except
Cambodia). This is illustrated in Figure A3 where we restrict the sample to countries with more than 500
observations.
26For calculations and discussion see Appendix C and Figures A4 to A7.
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comparable samples and exclude outliers of the value added data the two ways to calculate
weights yield very similar results. Second, moving away from large, comparable samples
the output loss measures look less similar. This is because the productivity weights given
to di¤erent rms, ic=c, uctuate dramatically in small samples if we use the sales and
cost data. The values of a very few rms then determine the total output loss estimate.
According to our model, some part of the estimated losses in Figure 4 are due to rms
which are most a¤ected by predation losses shedding labor and we would expect such
rms to expand were predation to be eliminated. This e¤ect can be captured empirically
in our framework by computing the di¤erence between

^ic=^c
 
1 
in the numerator
of (13) and (ic=c)

1  in the denominator. The output loss is always smaller without
labor reallocation. However, this decrease is fairly small; around 0.2 percent of output on
average.27 Note however, that we are not allowing the total amount of labor supplied to
the enterprise sector of the economy to vary and we are assuming that all rms use the
same technology. We will see below that when we look at this from a sectoral perspective
with sector-specic technologies and the possibility of inows of labor from other parts of
the economy, these labor reallocation e¤ects can be considerably larger.
7 Public and Private Protection
Our estimates so far have kept government policy in the background. However, a central
role of government is to determine the level of spending and the e¤ectiveness of state
institutions in maintaining law and order by limiting predation. Accordingly, developed
countries spend around 0.8 percent of their GDP on policing, prosecution, courts and
prisons.28 If this is the case, we would expect to nd that our measures of output loss are
correlated with proxies for the extent to which governments are actively ghting predation
through having an e¤ective criminal justice system.
27Figure A8 tries to gauge the importance of the labor reallocation e¤ect by plotting the output loss
in (13) when we replace (ic=c)
1
1  by (ic=c)

^ic=^c
 
1 
in the denominator. This is like assuming
that in the hypothetical no-predation scenario, labor allocation remains as it is in our data i.e., does not
move across rms because

^ic=^c
 
1 
= (lic=Lc)
.
28Estimate based on Farrell and Clark (2004). The lions share of this, around 60 percent, is spent on
policing. We use Eurostat data below which shows that countries in the European Union spend somewhat
more, between 1.1 and 2.3 percent of their GDP in 2015.
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In this section we therefore rst explore the trade-o¤between private and public spend-
ing in the data. For this, we explore data from Eurostat on spending by European states,
UNODC data on employment in the police, courts and prisons and an institutional mea-
sure of the e¤ectiveness of the criminal justice system. We rst explore this data to show
that public spending does not, in general, substitute for private spending and vice versa
so that the country ranking we found in the previous section is maintained. The data
is consistent with the idea that di¤erences in judicial institutions which do not generate
large budgetary requirements are at least partially responsible for this. We then use an
expansion of the model to simulate what would happen if countries adopted the policy en-
vironment of other countries. In particular, we analyze what would happen if the Chinese
protection patterns would be adopted elsewhere.
7.1 Public Protection and the Policy Environment
As a rst proxy for the policy environment, we use the World Justice project index which
is intended to measure the e¤ectiveness of the criminal justice system on a scale between
0 and 1. The index summarizes a range of factors which capture the e¤ectiveness and
impartiality of the criminal investigation system, the criminal adjudication system and
the correctional system. We relate this index to our output loss measures in Figure 5
for the case where  = 0, i.e. assuming that all predation is destructive. There is a
strong correlation between our two output loss measures (with and without heterogeneity
among rms) and this measure.29 If we were to interpret this correlation as causal (which
is obviously problematic), it says that the adoption of a system of criminal justice in
Venezuela with the e¤ectiveness of Chile would boost Venezualan output by around 2
percent. Similarly, adopting a legal system with the e¤ectiveness of Sweden, Chile would
gain more than 3 percent.30
To look at the quantitative importance of public protection, we will consider how our
29This relationship is robust to controlling for GDP per capita, political institutions and continent xed
e¤ects. This is not suprising given that many poor autocracies have relatively low crime rates. We also
nd that our estimate of pi (eic; gc) is positively correlated with the rm reporting that the court system
in the country is e¤ective, fair and free of corruption. This holds controlling for country/year xed e¤ects
and rm productivity.
30 We would, of course, expect other gains from improving the e¤ectiveness of criminal justice beyond
those highlighted here.
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measure of output loss changes if when employment devoted to establishing law and order is
E. This implies that the workforce available for private production/protection is reduced
to L   E: This can be incorporated into our output loss formula for country c which
becomes:
overallc = 1 

1  (E=L)c
1  (E=L)B

[1 c] (14)
where c is dened as in equation (13) and (E=L)B is the share of public employment
in the country which is chosen to be the low employment benchmark.31 Thus, there
is an additional factor a¤ecting output the loss due to the fact that productive labor is
diminished by state provision. One striking feature in all data related to spending is
that public spending does not rise as quickly as c falls with higher institutional scores.32
Many countries, such as South Korea, even tend to have relatively low public employment
in security-related occupations. Hence, adding in the losses from public sector does not
materially change the overall pattern across countries even though the output loss numbers
do increase.
To see this, we begin by taking the 13 European countries in our dataset where we
have good quality spending data on di¤erent types of public order from Eurostat sources.
Applying the results above we calculate public employment from the spending data as
(E=L)c = c= [c + ] where c is the share of GDP spent by the government. To facilitate
comparison with the earlier results, we continue to use South Korea as the benchmark for
measuring c. However, for public spending on establishing law and order, we use Sweden
(which has the lowest level of public spending) as our benchmark country since Eurostat
does not have South Korean data. The relationship between the total loss in equation
(14) and the criminal justice measure is shown in Panel A of Figure 6. The negative
relationship between the two suggests that more lawful countries have a lower overall loss.
31To see this, note that
Y^ = [1  (E=L)] L
X
i
i
i


 +
(1  )
1 + i
 
^i
^
! 
1  

+ i

and
Y  = [1  (E=L)B ] ' (B ; B)L
X
i
i

i

 1
1 
:
32In appendix Figure A9 we show that only employment by judges and magistrates is clearly positively
correlated with the institutional measure.
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Hence, it does not appear that a low level of predation is achieved through substituting
private protection for public protection. Instead, it suggests that it is a common set of
background cultural and/or institutional country-level features which enter the function
pi (ei; g) and are shaping the threat of predation to which both government and rms are
responding when deciding how much security to invest in.
While there are no comparable data on public order spending across a large set of
countries, UNODC does provide data on employment in the police force, courts and prison
sta¤ for the years 2003-2014. We use the total of these three numbers for each country and
then calculate the value relative to total employment to generate a measure of (E=L)c.
33
Since there are data for South Korea, we now use South Korea as the benchmark for both
public and private security, and predation levels. Using these data in equation (14), we
obtain a similar pattern to Panel A. This conrms that countries with betterlegal/justice
systems tend to have lower overall losses from crime even if public spending is taken into
account.34
7.2 A Calibrated Policy Environment
To explore the policy environment further, it is useful to work with a constant elasticity
functional form where:
pi (e; g) =
8<: "i (g) e
i(g)
i for "
i (g) ei(g)i  1
1 otherwise.
(15)
The parameter "i (g) can be thought of as the baseline level of protection perceived by
a rm which rationalizes its protection behavior and its reported loss. The parameter
i (g) is the protection e¤ort elasticity which consistent with the rms level of protection
spending. Both can depend on the policy environment, g, as well as other country-specic
factors. This functional form has the convenient property that a constant fraction of any
33We take employment data from the Penn World Tables version 8.0. Our measure of (E=L)c lies
between 0.004 for the Phillipines and 0.026 for Bosnia.
34As Figure A9 shows, the picture across di¤erent catergories of employment di¤ers somewhat. It is,
perhaps, interesting to note that there is a signicant positive relationship between the employment in
courts and the institutional measure.
23
rms labor force is used for protection purposes, i.e.
ei
li
=
i (g)
 + i (g)
:
Using (15) gives a specic interpretation of the heterogeneity in rmsdecisions in terms
of these technology parameters.35
To estimate i (g) directly from the share of sales that is spent on protection in rm i,
we use the observation that i (g) = i= [i + ]. The parameter "i (g) can be backed out
from observables by observing that, when rms make their optimal decisions, then:
"i (g) =
[li
i (g)]
 i(g)
(1 + i)
: (16)
Firm size, li, is increasing in i in equation (16) which implies that, in theory at least,
more productive rms should be less well-protected (all else equal). However, it is still an
open empirical question whether this is indeed the case in the data.36
For this exercise we will take China rather than South Korea as our benchmark country.
This is because the sample size in China is large enough to be able to disaggregate the
key parameters by productivity decile which turns out to be instructive and would not be
feasible given the sample size for South Korea. China is also a somewhat less ambitious
benchmark for a low and middle income countries. 37
Figure 6 returns to the China/Mexico comparison rst shown in Figure 3 but now
35We suppose that + i (g) < 1. Note that
li =

+ i (g)
0B@

"i (g) i
 
i (g)
i(g)
()


w
1CA
1
1  i(g)
so that variation in labor hired is increasing in "i (g) and i.
36This will depend in part on the covariance of i and i (g). Appendix Figure A10 plots our estimates
of protection, "i (g), against the percentile of rms in the rm-size distribution. This measure ranges from
around 1.04 to 0.93 and, as we expected, we nd a downward relationship with rm size. In Appendix
D, we explore correlates of perceived protection. We nd that rms that expect more protection (higher
"i (g)) report crime less as an obstacle. We also nd that rms located in the capital city perceive that
they are better protected from predation and that state owned and foreign rms seem better able to defend
against predation.
37Although China does have relatively low losses from predation and protection, Figure A2 in the
Appendix shows that there are countries in our data which have higher output than they would with
Chinese levels of predation and protection.
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plots the distribution of protection by productivity decile. They illustrate two archetypal
patterns in the data. Some countries seem to o¤er reasonably equal levels of protection
across rms, regardless of rm size whereas in others it tails o¤ markedly as rms get
larger. The latter pattern is well illustrated by Mexico while the pattern in China shows
little di¤erence in protection across the rm-size distribution. Drilling down this way into
country-specic patterns shows the value of being able to look at these issues through a
parametric interpretation of the rm-level data.
This observation about the di¤erence between China and Mexico inspires us to ask
what would happen if the protection and predation environment in China applied in other
countries.38 The pattern across rm sizes motivates an approach which applies the China
benchmark by rm size. Protection by rm size is a more reasonable benchmark than
assuming constant parameters across the board and will, in particular, highlight the po-
tential value in protecting larger, more productive rms. To do this we proceed as follows.
First, we divide all rms in each country into fty equal-size groups based on their relative
productivity, ic
c
. We then draw values of f"i (g) ; i (g)g at random from the observed dis-
tribution in each productivity group in China. Third, we give these values to rms in the
same productivity group in other countries in our data. We then compute the gains/losses
in output that this would yield. Since some countries have quite small sample sizes we
need to make sure we repeat this procedure and use the mean. We do so ve hundred
times and calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the gains/losses in output as
a form of "bootstrapping".39 This also gives us a standard deviation of the gains/losses.
Table 3 shows the change in output that we estimate in countries from this thought
experiment.40 To be included, the gain or loss needs to be statistically signicant, i.e. it
needs to be more than 1.65 times its standard deviation above or below zero. European
and Asian countries are largely absent from the table since we do not nd signicant gains
from having a Chinese-style protection environment. This contrasts with many African
and Latin American countries which mostly show positive and signicant gains. Columns
(1) and (4) of Table 3 focus on the output gain if  = 0. In some cases the output gains
38While we use values from China, the pattern is similar in other East Asian countries such as South
Korea, Thailand and Vietnam.
39Details of the procedure are in Appendix D.
40We exclude small territories with a population of less than one million as well as countries with less
than 100 observations in the enterprise surveys.
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from the policy experiment are substantial. For example, we estimate that Sierra Leone
could increase output in the enterprise sector by almost 7.8 percent by adopting a Chinese
pattern of protection and Mexico might increase output in the enterprise sector by 3.5
percent. Of course, this says nothing about how practically to achieve this nor the cost
of doing so. But it does give a sense of how much willingness to pay there might be for
bringing about changes which protect larger rms better.
In columns (2) and (5) we assume that  = 1. In this case, all changes are due to
labor re-allocation towards or away from protection. The gains remain substantial in most
countries. This column shows that the losses are very signicantly linked to protection;
the average change in output reported on the bottom of each column suggests that over
70 percent of all changes in output can be attributed to protection spending. This shows
how important it is to consider the protection margin in considering the output e¤ects of
lawlessness.
Column (3) reports the di¤erence between columns (1) and (2), i.e. the change in
output that is only due to di¤erences in predation losses. There is a signicant amount of
heterogeneity in the gains here with many countries gaining very little. Cambodia, for ex-
ample, would gain 3.12 percent of output entirely due to a reallocation from unproductive
to productive labor. In fact, countries with moderate gains in column (6) would benet
most from a reduction in protection e¤orts. The average gain in this group is 1.12 percent-
age points and 1.05 would come from changes in protection spending. This nding is in
line with Figure 2 which showed that most countries with low output losses face relatively
minor predation losses. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that for intermediate values of
public security provision the private response manages to prevent signicant losses from
predation.41 The countries that would gain most from an adoption of Chinese parameter
values tend to gain through both channels.
Importantly, the gains in Table 3 are fairly large when compared to the gains calculated
without rm heterogeneity.42 This underlines why looking at this for heterogeneous rms
is important and is coming from the fact that we assumed that rms at di¤erent parts of
41There is indeed a U-shape relationship between the share due to predation and our criminal justice
measure.
42See Figure A2 for comparisson. The simulation has the additional benet of providing an estimate of
the standard deviation of the loss. Some countries, like Vanuatu, with large losses are missing in Table 3
due to their high standard deviation.
26
the productivity distribution would be protected as in China. This helps heavily a¤ected
rms particularly. If these are productive rms then output benets particularly from the
adoption.
8 Further Analysis
Adding the Cost of Predation in Transit The more recent section of the World Bank
enterprise survey asks two additional questions on predation to measure the losses incurred
due to predation in transit.43 These questions are i) "In scal year [insert last complete
scal year] what percentage of the value of the products exported directly was lost while
in transit because of theft?" and ii) "In scal year [insert last complete scal year], what
percentage of the value of products this establishment shipped to supply domestic markets
was lost while in transit because of theft?". These represent additional losses which should
be taken into account.
Call these two losses transiti and 
export
i . We combine this data with the share of sales
in rm i which goes to domestic markets di to calculate the following measure of the loss
due to predation:
pi (ei; g) = 1=

1 + i + di
transit
i + (1  di)exporti

:
Incorporating this into the analysis results in an output loss for the case of homogeneous
and heterogeneous rms in Figure 8. Some countries, Sierra Leone and the Republic of
Congo for example, experience a dramatic increase in the estimated output loss if we allow
rms to be heterogeneous. The changes under the assumption of homogeneous rms tend
to be small. This makes sense given that large rms are more likely to sell their products
outside of local markets and hence are more subject to predation in transit.
The Size of the Enterprise Sector The model implicitly assumes that the level of
employment in the enterprise sector as covered by the World Bank enterprise surveys
remains constant. This can be thought of as a segmented labor-markets assumption.
The e¢ ciency e¤ects are therefore exclusively due to labor reallocation within the segment
43We are grateful to Hannes Malberg for drawing these survey questions to our attention.
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rather than between this segment of the private sector and other parts of the economy. We
now discuss how a further margin can matter due to entry and exit of labor from working
in the sector that is surveyed.
Our approach to this is very simple, supposing that there is a xed outside wage set
in either public employment or agriculture which we denote by !. This could be thought
of as a Lewis-style dual economy model where ! for the whole economy is the wage set in
agriculture. But labor reallocation could be from the public sector or the informal sector.
We show in the Appendix G that if we assume that ! is xed, i.e. there is no general
equilibrium response in the sector that is supplying labor to the formal enterprise sector,
then we can approximate the aggregate output loss as:
 ' 
1  
"
1 
 

^


!#
:
In interpreting this, it is useful to observe that 1 


^



is the measure of output loss
from our original expression (11). Thus, allowing for the aggregate labor force in the
enterprise sector to respond to increases the size of the welfare loss by a factor which is
approximately: = (1  ) ' 2, i.e. allowing for labor reallocation between sectors could
be thought of as roughly doubling the output loss that we estimated above. Of course,
this is only approximate and, given that ! does not respond, could be viewed as an upper
bound on the output loss. Moreover, it throws into sharp relief the fact that we have
maintained the assumption that  is assumed to be the same across economies. While
it would be straightforward to relax this for the purposes of calculation, it would a¤ect
how much labor reallocation across sectors to expect as predation changes as well as the
returns to labor reallocation within the sector.
It is worth underlining that we have assumed that ! is xed in this exercise. If ! did
respond to increased productivity in the formal enterprise sector, then we would expect
the output e¤ect to be dampened. However, part of the benet of reduced predation
and protection would then be experienced by increases in wages in other sectors of the
economy.44 Moreover, as this would be a shift from prots to wages, it would also be
44Also, according to ndings in Gould et al (2002) and Machin and Meghir (2004) criminals will leave
the predatory sector. This will free up additional labor. For example, the prison populations in Rwanda
and Russia are around 1 percent of the employed population.
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likely to create pro-worker redistributive e¤ects.
This discussion underlines the idea that we have been quite conservative in our core
estimates of the output loss from predation.
Reallocation Between Sectors We have assumed up until now that  is the same for
all rms. We now relax this assumption by assuming a sector-specic technology, i.e. s for
sector s. For sectoral labor intensity, we use the US economy as a benchmark. Specically,
we use payroll shares from Elsby et al (2013).45 Based on this, we use 32:2 percent as the
labor share in the primary sector for which we use the natural resources and mining sector
in the US. Construction in the US has a payroll share of 72:4 percent. For manufacturing
we calculate an average US labor share of 55:1 percent from durable goods manufacturing
and non-durable good manufacturing and for the services sector we calculate an average
of 57:5 percent from across all services sectors weighted by their value added. Using this,
we will estimate the sectoral output loss when labor allocation does not move as well as
the labor reallocation e¤ect from for every sector/country/year.46
In the case in which labor does not move then, following (11), the output loss from
predation in sector s is given by:
1  
^s

s
= 1 
P
i is
is
s
h
 + (1 )
1+is
i 
^is
^s
 s
1 s

s
s+is
s
P
i is

is
s
 1
1 s
: (17)
where we have used a benchmark of ' (B; B) = 1 and instead use Table 4 to compare
the loss in each sector for the quartiles of countries that are most (panel A) and least
a¤ected (panel B) by predation. We rst report raw data averages of is and is by
sector. In the third column of Table 4 we report our estimates of (17) by sector which
now takes into account rm heterogeneity. Panel A shows that the least a¤ected countries
lose around 0.7 per cent of output due to predation with little variation across sectors.
The most a¤ected countries in panel B show a little more variation across sectors with
the construction sector losing over 6.6 percent on average, i.e. almost 6 percentage points
45A similar argument is made in Hseih and Klenow (2009). Specically, we use a weighted average of
the payroll share from the year 2011 using the shares of value added as weights. All data is from Table 2
in Elsby et al (2013).
46We exclude sector/country/years with less than 10 rms in this and the following section.
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more than the least a¤ected countries.
Allowing s to vary has substantial consequences for the estimated employment e¤ects
using a model of the kind that we developed in the previous section where we assumed
a xed outside wage, !.47 Table 4, Panel A reports the employment loss from predation
for the least a¤ected countries which lies between 0.9 percent in the primary sector and
2.4 percent in construction. In the most a¤ected countries in panel B we estimate a
12.3 percent gain in manufacturing employment and a whopping 25.4 percent gain in
construction employment from eliminating predation. This means a loss of employment
when compared to the east a¤ected countries by more than 20 percentage points. Here,
relaxing the assumption of a common technology has an important bearing on the ndings
with labor intensive sectors being much more a¤ected in their total employment.48 The
greater output loss in construction is an immediate consequence of this being a more labor
intensive sector where labor distortions matter more.
To provide further insight into e¤ects of predation/protection on sector size, we conduct
an exercise along the lines of section 7 at the sector level. We do this by attributing values
of f"i (g) ; i (g)g from the Chinese construction sector to rms in the construction sector in
other countries. Since the sample of rms at the sector level is smaller, the standard errors
are inevitably somewhat larger. Nonetheless, we will get a feel for how much a sector might
expand with lower levels of predation. As above, we focus on countries where the output
change is statistically signicant; the results are presented in Table 5. This draws attention
in particular to a number of African economies where there are considerable gains. For
example, we estimate that output in the construction sector in Togo, Senegal, Zambia
and Botswana would expand by more than 10 percent if Chinese levels of protection were
available to rms in the construction sector.
47 Specically, we allow the labor allocated to sector s, denoted by Ls to vary when predation is
eliminated so that the marginal product of labor used in sector s is equal to !. Using this observation and
taking logs in a sector-specic version of equation (3) in Appendix G, we can estimate the proportionate
di¤erence in the size of the labor force in sector s with and without predation from:
ln
Ls
L^s
=
1
1  s ln

^s

s
:
48As we mentioned above, use of a Lewis-style model of labor allocation where there is an unlimited
supply of laborers tends to make these e¤ects labor allocation an upper bound. If ! were to increase due
to the elimination of predation in the enterprise sector, then these e¤ects would tend to be smaller.
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Impact on Investment and Firm Growth We have so far focused on a production
structure with only labor and a single distortion due to predation/protection. However,
it is straightforward to embed the approach in a more general setting while preserving the
insights that we use in tting the model to the data. Suppose, for example, that there is
both labor and capital and we have a Lucas (1978) span of control model with a decreasing
returns parameter ,49 i.e.
yi = ip
i (ei; g)
h
(li   ei) k(1 )i
i
:
This extension of the model allows us to think about how productivity a¤ects investment
in the constant elasticity model with parameters f"i (g) ; i (g)g. Appendix F shows that
the optimal capital stock is increasing in "i (g) and i (g) if pi (ei; g) < 1.50
Our data allow us to look at this empirically by looking at investment by rms.51
Specically, we look at whether a rm reports purchasing any xed asset and/or expendi-
ture in xed assets over the previous year. The results are reported in Table 6 and include
country-year xed e¤ects, sector xed e¤ects and dummies for rm-size class. Columns (1)
through (3) show that there is positive correlation between investment and our measure of
rm-level protection as well as our measure of the productivity of protection. Column (1)
uses data on a general question regarding the purchase of any xed asset. A one standard
deviation increase in the protection parameter increases investments by 1.8 percent. An
increase in the elasticity of protection e¤ort increases the likelihood of an investment by
3.5 percent.
Columns (2) and (3) use data on xed asset purchases which is reported less frequently
by rms. Column (2) nds patterns that are broadly consistent with the ndings on the
correlation with protection in column (1). Column (3) focuses on the intensive margin of
rm investments as the log function leads to the exclusion of all zero investments. E¤ects on
49It would be straightforward to have a standard monopolistic competition model with a constant
markup instead.
50This assumption implies decreasing returns in fli; kig overall. To see this observe that in this case, we
can write:
yi = i"
i (g)

i (g)
i(g) 
1  i (g) h(li)i(g)+ (ki)(1 )i
51To map formally from the capital stock to investment, it would be straightforward to introduce ad-
justment costs along with shocks to i:
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this margin are consistent with the theory and fairly large. A standard deviation increase
in protection implies an increase of investment by almost 12 percent. An increase of the
protection elasticity by one standard deviation implies an increase in investment by more
than 18 percent. Thus, as we would expect, predation and protection are also related to
investment decisions. This pattern of investment e¤ects largely corroborates our ndings
on rm perceptions reported in the Appendix D.
Selection and Incentive E¤ects on Productivity While investment is important,
it is only one dimension of a wider set of margins on which predation can a¤ect rm
performance. Returning to the base line model with only labor, note that rm prots as
a function of i with optimal labor allocation decisions fli (g; w) ; ei (g; w)g are:
Si (g; w; i) = ip
i (ei (g; w) ; g) (l

i (g; w)  ei (g; w))   wli (g; w) :
There are possible selection and incentive e¤ects which can a¤ect i and which respond to
the threat of predation. The selection e¤ect comes from making endogenous which rms
are active. Suppose that there is a xed cost F of being active then the critical e¢ ciency
level above which a rm is active, given by ~i (g; w), is dened by:
Si

g; w; ~i (g; w)

= F .
If pig > 0, then a marginal increase in g reduces ~i (g; w).
52 Hence less e¢ cient rms can
a¤ord to be active in the market all else equal when there is a lower threat of predation.
Note, however, the distribution of predation and productivity matters for the selection
e¤ect. If predation is concentrated among high productivity rms, then they may close
down. In that case average productivity in the economy as a whole could be higher when
g is increased. This has implications for the countries identied above, such as Mexico.
There is also the possibility of an incentive e¤ect which applies to e¤orts by rms to
52This follows from noting that:
Sig (g; w; i) = ip
i
g (e

i (g; w) ; g) (l

i (g; w)  ei (g; w)) > 0
and
Si (g; w; i) = p
i (ei (g; w) ; g) (l

i (g; w)  ei (g; w)) > 0:
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increase their productivity. This could be due to variety of decisions that rms make. Here,
we will focus on managerial decision-making as a source of productivity di¤erences.53 To
model this simply suppose that i (Ii) where Ii is rm-level managerial e¤ort measured in
units of labor input. The rst order condition for managerial e¤ort is:
@i (I

i (g))
@Ii

pi (ei (g; w) ; g) (l

i (g; w)  ei (g; w))

= w
where we have used the envelope condition for fli (g; w) ; ei (g; w)g. We show in the appen-
dix that, with a constant elasticity functional form for the value of managerial e¤ort given
by i =
i
1  (Ii)
1  ; then the relative productivity of a rm with and without predation,
in terms of the observable i is
54

1
1 + i
 1 
 
< 1
if  >  which is the empirically plausible case since we expect  ' 2=3 and  ' 0:2.55 To
illustrate the productivity consequences of predation via this channel, note that if  = 0:66
and  = 0:2, a rm that loses 2% of its output due to predation experiences a 4% fall in
productivity due to lower managerial e¤ort.
We can use this simple model to see what happens to the aggregate loss with het-
erogenous rms when  = 0:66 and  = 0:2. In this thought experiment we maintain the
benchmark crime loss from South Korea. On average the loss increases from about 2.6
percent to 5.2 percent. Three things about this are worth noting. First, regardless our
assumptions on  the predation loss i will lower output as managerial e¤ort does not
internalize the gain to predators. Second, the e¤ect will shift the magnitude of the loss
due to predation compared to that due to spending on security; the share of the loss due
to predation increases from around 30% to 50%. Third, the e¤ect di¤ers depending on
both the level of predation and its distribution across rms. The estimated output loss in
Cambodia, for example, barely changes from 4.2 percent under the model in equation (13)
to a loss of 4.7 percent in the modied model. However, the estimate for Mexico increases
53Bloom and VanReenen (2007) suggests that this is empirically important.
54The adjusted to productivity depends only on i. We show in Appendix I that this is due to security
spending being chosen optimally by the rm.
55Prendergast (2015) estimates the e¤ect of managerial e¤ort in the U.S. to be lower than 0.25.
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from 4.3 percent to 7.6 percent in the modied model which reects the fact that large
rms are more exposed to predation. The loss in Afghanistan is now estimated to be a
striking 23 percent.
Although specic to one channel, the analysis in this section illustrates why our esti-
mates of the put loss from predation are likely to be a lower bound on true losses. It also
illustrates the value of an approach which builds up to the macro-picture from specic
distortions which can be studied in micro-economic terms.
9 Concluding Comments
One important feature of many developing and emerging market economies is the extent to
which rms face threats of predation due to weakness in law and order. We have emphasized
the possibility that rms will respond to this threat by diverting labor from productive
uses towards protecting themselves. While this reduces the expected loss from predation
it also reduces labor available for productive purposes.
We have incorporated the possibility of predation and protection into a simple model
to illustrate how it a¤ects the allocation of labor across rms. The model was used to
derive an expression for productivity which reects the costs of predation. By writing this
in terms of observables, we are able to use data from the World Bank enterprise surveys to
estimate these losses based on answers to survey questions posed to rms about losses from
robbery, theft, arson and vandalism as well as the amount that they spend on security.
Heterogeneity in predation threats and protection technologies mean that rms vary
in the extent to which they experience an output loss. All else equal, rms that su¤er
less or have no viable protection technology hire more productive workers as a fraction
of their total employment. This results in labor misallocation across rms even when the
marginal product of labor is equalized across rms. We quantify this and show sizeable
output losses which vary by country and rm-size. Around two thirds of these losses are
due to protection rather than predation. Given the size and growth of the private security
sector in developed countries this point is of considerable importance here as well.
By extending the model to allow for sector-specic labor intensities, we can estimate the
extent of labor across sectors that we might expect if predation were reduced. We estimate
that employment in the sector with the highest labor intensity, construction, might expand
by more than 20 percent if predation could be lowered in high predation countries.
We have also use a specic parametrization of the protection technology to look at
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patterns of predation across and within countries. Our analysis suggests that East Asian
countries protect their large rms better than most other developing countries. Adopting
the pattern of protection found in China, for example, would provide signicant output
gains for countries most a¤ected by predation. That said, it is clear that this nding is only
suggestive with a more complete policy analysis having to consider the costs of di¤erent
policy interventions.
The analysis developed here is deliberately simple in order to home in on the new
issues. We have focused on one distortion and have not considered a wider range of policy
failures which could also be important including taxes, corruption or regulations. These
are all part of the i term in the model. We have also abstracted from a range of frictions
in rm level decisions such as adjustment costs and capital constraints. To the degree that
they are positively correlated with the vulnerability to crime, for example due to a general
absence of the state, we would expect our estimates to be a lower bound on the cost of
crime.
While the analysis provides a range of insights, much remains to be done to provide a
more complete picture of how predation a¤ects labor allocation and productivity. First, we
are holding other distortions in the economy as xed when we look at the e¤ect of improv-
ing protection. It is quite possible that distortions other than that focused on here are more
quantitatively important in explaining low levels of productivity in some countries. Follow-
ing Hseih and Klenow (2009), capital market misallocation is a case in point. Moreover, it
is possible that both capital and labor enters the protection technology. Second, our data
allows us to sidestep the discussion of positive and negative spillovers between rms who
choose their levels of protection.56 However, for policy this is an important issue. Third,
we have not considered the role of public protection and how it interacts with protection
decisions at the rm level. Our estimates suggest that the level of private protection might
exceed the share of labor force allocated to public protection. The interaction between
rmsdecisions to protect and policy making requires investigation. Fourth, more could
be done to capture a wider range of channels through which predation a¤ects productivity
56Ayres and Levitt (1998) discuss the importance of spillovers and provide empirical evidence for a
positive spill over from investing in protection. Bandiera (2003) provides evidence for a negative spill-over
in the context of Sicilian land protection. See also Draka and Machin (2015) for a discussion. Clotfelter
(1977) provides an early discussion and empirical investigation of the interplay between private and public
provision of protection.
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through selection and incentives. A full treatment of this would require modeling rm
dynamics but would also provide a link to the growth literature.
This paper has shown that in study the consequences of predation in any context,
the distortionary e¤ect of private protection needs to be taken into consideration. And
understanding this requires modeling specic micro-economic consequences of predation.
Only then can the full range of consequences of state ine¤ectiveness be appreciated.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on the Firm Level
Obs. Mean SD Min Max
share of total annual sales paid for 
security 155,915 0.017 0.048 0 0.99
loss due to theft, robbery, vandalism 
or arson as a share of total annual 
sale 155,915 0.008 0.040 0 0.99
firm size (number of workers) 155,915 119.9 678.2 1 65994
firm reports paying for security 155,915 0.62 0.49 0 1
firm reports a loss due to predation 155,915 0.20 0.40 0 1
number of firms interviewed in 
country/year 155,915 2411 2125 59 9183
firm reports crime as worst obstacle 108,665 0.04 0.19 0 1
Table 2: Simple Output Loss Calculations
Estimate α Mean Share SD
0.9 0.0180 0.0416
0.66 0.0237 0.0524
0.5 0.0299 0.0637
0.9 0.0248 0.0526
0.66 0.0245 0.0515
0.5 0.0242 0.0505
output loss (τ=1) 0.66 0.0160 0.0366
share of workers employed in 
protection
output loss (τ=0)
Notes: Table shows summary statistics for our main variables. The response to "share of total annual sales paid for security" is our measure 
of spending on security. The response to "loss due to theft, robbery, vandalism or arson as a share of total annual sale" is our main measure 
of predation.
Notes: The table shows estimates from our benchmark model with identical firms. The parameter α is the 
standard parameter on labor from the production function.  The parameter τ captures the extent to which 
predation is a transfer to the criminal, under τ=1 all predation losses for the firm are gains for the criminal. 
The only loss from crime is then generated by security spending.
Table 3: Policy Experiment - Adoption of Chinese Protection Parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
country
estimated 
change in 
output
estimated 
change in 
output 
(protection)
estimated 
change in 
output 
(predation) country
estimated 
change in 
output
estimated 
change in 
output 
(protection)
estimated 
change in 
output 
(predation)
Lesotho 12.32% 4.71% 7.61% North Sudan 1.85% 2.17% -0.32%
C. African Republic 11.33% 6.78% 4.55% Mauritius 1.81% 1.39% 0.42%
Sierra Leone 7.75% 6.28% 1.47% Namibia 1.78% 1.38% 0.40%
Malawi 6.79% 4.58% 2.21% Philippines 1.78% 1.47% 0.31%
Swaziland 5.66% 4.28% 1.39% Botswana 1.76% 0.55% 1.21%
Afghanistan 4.56% 2.31% 2.24% El Salvador 1.73% 1.34% 0.39%
Zambia 4.48% 2.74% 1.74% Malaysia 1.62% 1.64% -0.02%
Angola 4.45% 4.42% 0.03% Russian Federation 1.62% 1.35% 0.26%
Honduras 4.39% 2.90% 1.48% Azerbaijan 1.60% 2.16% -0.56%
Cameroon 4.02% 2.71% 1.30% Tanzania 1.54% 1.40% 0.15%
Gambia, The 4.00% 3.28% 0.72% Moldova 1.37% 1.59% -0.22%
Burkina Faso 3.96% 4.46% -0.50% Ukraine 1.37% 1.33% 0.04%
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3.72% 3.32% 0.40% Brazil 1.26% 1.06% 0.19%
Liberia 3.66% 2.26% 1.39% Kazakhstan 1.22% 1.23% -0.01%
Mexico 3.52% 1.13% 2.38% Togo 1.22% 1.21% 0.01%
Timor-Leste 3.39% 2.96% 0.44% Solomon 1.21% 1.54% -0.33%
Cambodia 3.39% 3.12% 0.27% Macedonia, FYR 1.21% 1.06% 0.15%
Congo, Rep. 3.23% 2.65% 0.58% Mongolia 1.19% 1.13% 0.06%
Cote d'Ivoire 3.11% 1.97% 1.14% Senegal 1.13% 1.04% 0.09%
Chad 2.96% 1.75% 1.21% Ghana 1.06% 1.26% -0.19%
South Sudan 2.87% 1.81% 1.06% Mali 1.05% 1.37% -0.32%
Kosovo 2.82% 3.22% -0.40% Zimbabwe 1.03% 1.03% 0.00%
Ecuador 2.50% 1.73% 0.77% Sri Lanka 1.03% 0.87% 0.15%
Venezuela 2.30% 2.16% 0.14% Serbia 1.00% 0.47% 0.53%
Mozambique 2.24% 1.44% 0.80% Madagascar 0.98% 0.95% 0.03%
Kenya 2.23% 1.55% 0.68% Romania 0.95% 0.97% -0.02%
Dominican Republic 2.18% 1.96% 0.22% Guyana 0.90% 0.92% -0.02%
Nigeria 2.17% 2.27% -0.10% Panama 0.85% 0.78% 0.07%
Guatemala 2.10% 1.40% 0.69% Turkey 0.78% 1.05% -0.27%
Uganda 2.00% 2.02% -0.02% South Africa 0.76% 0.37% 0.39%
Rwanda 1.98% 2.29% -0.31% Estonia 0.75% 0.66% 0.09%
Guinea 1.98% 1.95% 0.03% Bolivia 0.71% 0.44% 0.27%
Paraguay 1.92% 1.84% 0.08% Pakistan 0.69% 1.07% -0.37%
Nicaragua 1.91% 1.62% 0.29% Argentina 0.61% 0.25% 0.36%
Kyrgyzstan 1.86% 1.79% 0.08% Slovenia -0.53% -0.19% -0.34%
Tajikistan 1.86% 2.29% -0.43% Jordan -0.61% -0.32% -0.29%
Average in column: 3.77% 2.78% 0.99% 1.12% 1.05% 0.06%
Notes: Change in output is calculated by replacing the gamma and protection elasticity in each firm by a random draw from the 
Chinese parameter values for firms of similar relative productivity (50 categories). We do this repeatedly (500 iterations) and report the 
mean of those countries whose mean change in output is larger in absolute terms than 1.65 the standard deviations of the change in 
output. "Change in output (protection") uses the assumption tau=1 to estimate the loss just from the distortions caused by protection. 
"Change in output (predation)" is the difference between the first two columns and captures the otuptut change that derives from just 
predation. We drop countries and territories with less than 1 million inhabitants and less than 100 interviewed firms.
Table 4: Estimated Output Loss and Employment Loss by Sector
sector
losses due to 
predation
spending on 
security
average output 
loss
average 
employment loss
Primary 1.11% 0.23% 0.62% 0.91%
Manufacturing 0.72% 0.26% 0.73% 1.63%
Services 0.63% 0.33% 0.78% 1.85%
Construction 0.75% 0.37% 0.67% 2.44%
sector
losses due to 
predation
spending on 
security
average output 
loss
average 
employment loss
Primary 5.24% 2.56% 6.10% 9.37%
Manufacturing 3.37% 1.94% 5.33% 12.32%
Services 3.44% 1.86% 5.88% 14.40%
Construction 3.83% 2.36% 6.61% 25.36%
Panel A: countries least affected by crime
Panel B: countries most affected by crime
Notes: "Losses due to predation" and "spending on security" are relative to sales. Other numbers 
are relative to output and employment in that sector repectively. "Countries least affected by 
crime" are countries in the quartile with the lowest estimated output loss. "Countries most affected 
by crime are countries" in the quartile with the highest estimated output loss. Calculations assume 
α=0.322 for the primary sector, α=0.551 for manufacturing, α=0.575 for services and α=0.724 for 
construction. Note, that we assume a benchmark loss of 0 in the calculations here.
Table 5: Policy Experiment - Adoption of Chinese Protection Parameters in Construction
country
estimated change in 
output in the 
construction sector country
estimated change in 
output in the 
construction sector
Senegal 30.8% Kazakhstan 2.2%
Zambia 21.0% Czech Republic 2.1%
Togo 20.0% Azerbaijan 2.1%
Botswana 10.2% Albania 2.0%
Malawi 10.1% Germany 2.0%
Nicaragua 9.8% Argentina 1.9%
Philippines 7.8% Russia 1.9%
Mauritius 7.3% Mali 1.8%
South Sudan 7.0% Moldova 1.8%
Cambodia 7.0% Paraguay 1.6%
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6.5% Estonia 1.5%
Madagascar 6.1% Macedonia, FYR 1.4%
Nigeria 5.8% Timor-Leste 1.4%
El Salvador 5.7% Belarus 1.3%
Burkina Faso 5.6% Armenia 1.3%
Kyrgyzstan 5.6% Mongolia 1.3%
Egypt 5.3% Vietnam 1.2%
Namibia 4.5% India 1.2%
Brazil 4.2% Romania 1.2%
Tunisia 4.1% Lithuania 1.2%
Cameroon 3.4% Bulgaria 1.1%
Colombia 3.4% Poland 0.9%
Kosovo 3.3% Spain -1.1%
Bolivia 3.2% Israel -1.5%
Ukraine 2.9% Lebanon -1.6%
Ecuador 2.8% Sweden -1.9%
Tajikistan 2.7% Afghanistan -2.2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.5% Mexico -4.0%
Average in column: 7.63% 0.96%
Table 6: Crime and Firm Growth
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES firm purchased asset
firm purchased fixed 
asset
ln(fixed asset 
expenditure)
perceived protection 0.0178*** 0.00784** 0.119***
(0.00399) (0.00389) (0.0322)
protection effort elasticity 0.0351*** 0.00691* 0.180***
(0.00416) (0.00389) (0.0297)
firm productivity decile 
dummies yes yes yes
country/year fixed effects yes yes yes
sector fixed effect yes yes yes
Observations 135,283 76,718 59,174
R-squared 0.244 0.405 0.753
Note: Change in output is calculated by replacing the gamma and protection elasticity in each firm 
by a random draw from the Chinese parameter values for firms in the construction sector. We do 
this repeatedly (500 iterations) and report the mean for those countries whose mean change in 
output is larger in absolute terms than 1.65 the standard deviations of the change in output. We drop 
countries and territories with less than 1 million inhabitants and less than 20 interviewed firms in 
construction.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimates assume α=0.66. 
"perceived protection" is the estimate of the epsilon parameter. "protection effort elasticity" is the 
estimate of the γ parameter. Both variables are weighted by their standard error.
Figure 1: Country Averages of Predation Loss and Security Spending
Notes: Figure shows simple mean values for the responses to two survery questions. We first calculate the weighted mean for every country/year using the survey weights. 
This is close to what the World Bank reports. The Figure displays the mean value for each country across years.
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Figure 2: Histogram of Estimated Output Loss
Notes: Figure contrasts two ways of calculating the output, Δc, from equation (12) . The output loss in Panel A is calculated under the assumption that all predation
constitutes a loss (τ=0). The loss due to spending in Panel B is calculated by assuming that all predation is an efficient transfer (τ=1).
Panel A: Estimated Output Loss
Panel B: Estimated Output Loss Without Predation
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Figure 3: Estimated Loss by Firm Productivity Deciles
Notes: Figure shows the output loss, Δc, from equation (12)  calculated by productivity decile, i.e. each point represents one tenth of the firms in the respective sample
ordered by our estimate of θ/ϴ. Note that in both cases we maintain South Korea as a benchmark crime loss.
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Figure 4: Introducing Productivity Weights
Notes: Figure contrasts the output loss, Δc, from equation (12)  on the x‐axis with the output loss, Δc, from equation (13). In each case we first calculate the output loss for
each country/year and then take the mean value for the respective country. The red line represents the points at which the two losses are the same. The Central African
Republic dropped as an outlier.
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Figure 5: Estimated Output Loss and State Action
Panel A: Output Loss Estimated Assuming Homogenous Firms
Panel B: Output Loss Estimated Assuming Heterogenous Firms
Notes: Panel A shows the output loss, Δc, from equation (12)  and Panel B shows the output loss, Δc, from equation (13). This is contrasted with the World Justice project 
index which measures the effectiveness of the criminal justice system on a scale between 0 and 1.
Afghanistan
Albania
Argentina
Bangladesh
Belarus
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina FasoCambodia
Cameroon
Chile
China
Colombia
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
Lebanon
Liberia
MacedoniaMadagasc r
Malawi
Malaysia
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama
PeruPhilippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
UruguayUzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
0
.
0
2
.
0
4
.
0
6
.
0
8
.
1
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
l
o
s
s
.2 .4 .6 .8
criminal justice
Afghanistan
Albania
Argentina
Bangladesh
Belarus
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Cameroon
Chile
China
Colombia
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Georgia
GermanyGhanaGreece
Guatemala
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
Lebanon
Liberia
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
MalaysiaMexico Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Pa ama
Per
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
South Korea
Romania
Russia
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
0
.
0
2
.
0
4
.
0
6
.
0
8
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
l
o
s
s
.2 .4 .6 .8
criminal justice
Figure 6: Estimated Output Loss and State Action
Panel A: Total Output Loss Using EU Public Spending Data
Panel B: Total Output Loss Using UNODC Employment Data
Notes: Panels A and B show the output loss from equation (14) as discussed in the text. This is contrasted with the World Justice project index which measures the 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system on a scale between 0 and 1.
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Figure 7: Protection Estimates by Firm Productivity Deciles
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Notes: The Figure displays the average value of ϵ from equation (15) by productivity decile, i.e. each point represents one tenth of the firms in the respective sample ordered
by our estimate of θ/ϴ.
Figure 8: Adding Predation During Transport
Notes: Figure contrasts the output loss from equation (12)  on the x‐axis with the output loss from equation (13).  The only difference to Figure 4 is that we add predation
losses due to theft in transit or export.  For details see section 8 in the main text. South Korea is the mimum crime benchmark but has no data on losses during transport. The
red line represents the points at which the two losses are the same. 
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